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Abstract: We develop a simple open-economy AK model with collateral constraints that
accounts for growth-reversal episodes, during which countries face abrupt changes in their growth
rate that lead to either growth miracles or growth disasters. Absent commitment to investment
by the borrowing country, imperfect contract enforcement leads to an informational lag such that
the debt contracted upon today depends upon the past stock of capital. The no-commitment
delay originates a history eﬀect by which the richer a country has been in the past, the more
it can borrow today. For (arbitrarily) small deviations from perfect contract enforcement, the
history eﬀect oﬀsets the growth benefits from international borrowing and dampens growth, and
it leads to leapfrogging in long-run levels. When large enough, the history eﬀect originates growth
reversals and we connect the latter to leapfrogging. Finally, we argue that the model accords with
the reported evidence on growth disasters and growth accelerations. We also provide examples
showing that leapfrogging and growth reversals may coexist, so that currently poor but fast-
growing countries experiencing sharp growth reversals may end up, in the long-run, significantly
richer than currently rich but declining countries.
Keywords: Growth Reversals, Leapfrogging, International Borrowing, Open Economies
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: F34, F43, O40,
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31 Introduction
Since the 1950s, growth reversals have been experienced by most economies, especially,
though not only, developing countries. During these ubiquitous episodes, countries have
faced abrupt changes in their growth rate leading to either growth miracles - when the
growth rate suddenly goes from below to above trend - or growth disasters (Hausmann,
Pritchett and Rodrik [11], Jones and Olken [12], Cuberes and Jerzmanowski [7]). It is
a striking observation that many of the countries which are susceptible to growth rever-
sals are also heavily indebted. For instance, countries like Kenya, Trinidad and Tobago,
Jordan or the Philippines have been through severe growth trend breaks over the last
decades (Cuberes and Jerzmanowski [7]). At the same time, they have relied more and
more heavily on international borrowing and hold net foreign asset positions that are neg-
ative and around half of their GDPs (Lane and Milesi-Ferreti [14]). Although this fact
alone suggests that access to international financial markets might aﬀect the occurrence
of growth reversals, the literature has largely overlooked such a potential relationship.
In this paper, we show that international borrowing may trigger growth reversals.
More precisely, we assume that due to imperfect enforcement of borrowing contracts, the
richer a country has been in the past, the more it can borrow today, which originates a
history eﬀect. Such a dependence on history implies that the growth rate today depends
on the entire growth path followed by the economy in the past, and not simply the ini-
tial capital stock as in a standard AK model. One key contribution of this paper is to
show that this history eﬀect oﬀsets the growth benefits of international borrowing and
dampens growth, and that it may lead to both leapfrogging and growth reversals.
Similar to the large literature showing that foreign borrowing might be detrimental
to macroeconomic stability (see, among many others, Paasche [16], Aghion et al. [1],
Mendoza [15], Devereux and Yetman [8]), we focus on capital equipment as pledgeable
4collateral. However, our main departure from the existing body of research is that we
relax the assumption of commitment to investment. We posit that the debtor country
cannot commit to an investment strategy at the time the lender decides about the level of
debt (that is expected to be repaid next period). Absent commitment, it is then natural
to assume that in order to implement legal enforcement, the debt contract has to depend
upon past values of the capital stock (e.g. the value reported in the debtor’s balance
sheets). In other words, imperfect contract enforcement implies an informational lag.
We introduce such a lag by assuming that the debt contracted upon at date t depends
upon the stock of capital at t− τ .
Although highly stylized, our modeling captures in a simple way the broader view
that in a world with potential debtor default and collateral constraints, the borrowing
country’s past growth performances and reputation matter for determining its ability
to borrow. In fact, our formulation is reminiscent of a conjecture in Cohen and Sachs
[6], who have pointed out in a discrete-time model that absent commitment, the lender
might set a borrowing limit that depends upon last period’s capital stock. However,
we show in appendix A that the discrete-time version of our model with a one-period
lag cannot explain growth reversals. In addition, longer lags lead to higher-dimensional,
nonlinear diﬀerence equations that are not easily amenable to analysis, contrary to our
continuous-time formulation which gives rise to a linear diﬀerential equation with lagged
capital and its lagged rate of change (Neutral delay Diﬀerential Equation, or NDE for
short).
We introduce international borrowing without commitment in a simple open-economy
version of the AK setting with collateral constraints. With a constant savings rate,
the dynamics of the economy follows a linear NDE with an exogenous delay.1 First,
1As a robustness check, we show in Appendix E that the optimal control problem delivers the same
mathematical structure, with dynamics still given by a linear NDE.
5we show that there is a unique balanced-growth path (BGP for short), such that the
positive growth rate declines with the no-commitment delay. Because how much the
economy borrows today depends upon its lagged stock of collateral (capital), a history
eﬀect materializes and oﬀsets the growth-enhacing eﬀect of foreign debt, and ultimately
it dampens growth. Essentially, a slow-growing country that has been rich in the past
has better access to international debt markets than a fast-growing but still catching-up
country. The history eﬀect may significantly dissipate the growth benefits from foreign
borrowing for small values of the no-commitment delay. This is because the level of the
open-economy BGP growth rate converges exponentially fast to the autarkic one when
the delay increases from zero.
Second, we prove that the BGP is stable and an important by-product of our stability
analysis is that we characterize the long-run level of capital and output as well. We
show that the long-run level depends upon the initial growth path, which is a striking
departure from the standard AK model in which what determines the long-run level is
the initial capital stock only. Moreover, we show that leapfrogging in long-run levels
occurs for (arbitrarily) small delays, that is, for small deviations from perfect contract
enforcement: the growth-enhancing eﬀect then dominates the history eﬀect, so that the
fast-growing (but poor) country eventually leapfrogs the slow-growing (but rich) country.
We then move on to study short-run dynamics and provide a simple necessary and
suﬃcient condition for growth reversals to occur, which turns out to be met if the delay
is large enough and provided that the economy is not declining too fast initially. As both
long-run eﬀects and short-run dynamics depend on the initial growth path, we connect
leapfrogging and growth reversals by showing that the absence of the former implies the
latter: when the history eﬀect is suﬃciently large to rule out leapfrogging, it dominates
the growth eﬀect of foreign borrowing and leads to growth reversals.
Fourth, we study the quantitative implications of our analytical results. In our sug-
6gestive numerical examples, financial openness with commitment increases the growth
rate by 2 percentage points over and above the growth rate under autarky. However,
these growth benefits dissipate quite fast as the no-commitment delay increases from
zero. Then we show that the model’s predictions regarding the changes in the growth
rate at break dates accord with the evidence documented, e.g., by Cuberes and Jerz-
manowski [7]. In particular, the model predicts growth disasters and miracles that are
of the correct magnitude. Last but not least, we provide the first application (to our
knowledge) of NDEs to economics, which allows us to uncover some powerful economic
mechanisms that may cause both leapfrogging and growth reversals, such as the ones
mentioned above.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the credit-constained open-
economy AK model and shows uniqueness and stability of the BGP with positive growth.
Section 3 derives conditions for leapfrogging and growth reversals to occur and it also
discusses quantitative implications. Finally, section 4 concludes and is followed by ap-
pendices containing proofs.
2 The Open AK Economy
The economy produces a tradeable good Y by using physical capital K, according to
the following technology:
Y = AK, (1)
where A > 0 is total factor productivity. Whereas output is tradeable, labor and capital
are not.2
2Our results are virtually unchanged under capital mobility, which sets the net marginal product of
capital to the world interest rate.
7The Ramsey households are defined by their utility:
8 ∞
0
e−ρt
C(t)1−θ − 1
1− θ dt, (2)
where C > 0 is consumption, θ ≥ 0, and ρ ≥ 0 is the discount rate. The budget constraint
is:
K˙(t)− D˙(t) = AK(t)− δK(t)− rD(t)− C(t), (3)
where D is the amount of net foreign debt and the initial stocks K(0) > 0, D(0) are
given to the households.
We focus on collateral-constrained borrowing without commitment to investment and,
following Cohen and Sachs [6], we posit that the creditor lends up to some fraction of
the past value of collateral λK(t− τ), for some exogenous (no-commitment) delay τ ≥ 0
and λ > 0.
Assumption 2.1 Foreign borrowing is subject to a limit such that D(t) = λK(t − τ),
with λ > 0 and τ ≥ 0.
Replacing D by its expression from Assumption 2.1, the budget constraint (3) can be
written as:
K˙(t) = λK˙(t− τ) + (A− δ)K(t)− rλK(t− τ)− C(t), (4)
We explore the simplest case of constant savings rate and we show, in Appendix E,
that the dynamics of the economy obtained by maximizing (2) subject to (4) has the
same mathematical structure. Therefore, our stability analysis applies to the optimal
control problem as well.
We suppose that consumption is a constant fraction of output, that is, C = (1− s)Y ,
where 1 > s > 0 is the savings rate. This implies that the budget constraint (4) is a
linear Neutral delay Diﬀerential Equation (NDE for short), as both K and K˙ are delayed
8(see Bellman and Cooke [4, chap. 6]):
K˙(t) = λK˙(t− τ) + εK(t)− rλK(t− τ), (5)
where ε ≡ sA− δ > 0. Note that under autarky, the economy does not borrow - that is,
λ = 0 - so that the corresponding growth rate is ga ≡ ε > 0. The remaining part of this
section is devoted to the analysis of the dynamics and asymptotic properties of equation
(5) when λ > 0 . This is the first application of NDEs to economics we know of, which is
presumably explained by the fact that the mathematical literature on this topic is scant.
2.1 Balanced Growth Paths
A balanced growth path (BGP for short) is a trajectoryK(t) = egt that solves (5), that
is, such that g is a solution to g = ε+λ(g− r)e−gτ . In the benchmark case of borrowing
under commitment, τ = 0 and solving the above equation gives the expression of the
no-delay growth rate g0 ≡ (ε− rλ)/(1− λ). It is straightforward to prove the following.
Proposition 2.1 (No-Delay BGP)
Assume that ε ≡ sA− δ > r and 1 > λ. It follows that for τ = 0, there exists a no-delay
BGP with g0 = (ε− rλ)/(1− λ) > ga and such that dg0/dλ > 0.
The assumption that sA−δ > r means that the economy is productive enough to aﬀord
foreign borrowing, given the level of the world interest rate, and it implies that foreign
debt then fosters growth. This captures the growth-enhancing eﬀect coming from access
to international financial markets. In addition, λ is constrained to be smaller than one
to reflect the fact that only a fraction of capital can be seized in case the debtor defaults,
because contract enforcement is costly (see Djankov et al. [9] for some evidence).3 Under
3Alternatively, our analysis goes through if λ > 1 and ε < rλ, with similar results.
9commitment - that is, when τ = 0 - the model boils down to the standard AK model
and there is no transitional dynamics, as the economy jumps to the no-delay BGP at the
initial date. Therefore, the growth rate equals g0 forever and growth reversals cannot
occur.4
Absent commitment, however, we assume that an information lag due to imperfect
contract enforcement implies τ > 0. We define the characteristic function as Q(x) ≡
x− ε + λ(r − x)e−xτ , whose roots give the BGP growth rates. Diﬀerent from standard
characteristic polynomials, Q is a transcendental function, hence it admits infinitely
many roots in the complex plane. The following technical lemma shows existence of two
real roots.
Lemma 2.1 (Characteristic Roots with Delay)
Under the assumptions of Proposition 2.1 and τ > 0, there exist a unique characteristic
real root gτ > 0 and a unique characteristic real root hτ < 0 that solve g = ε+λ(g−r)e−gτ .
Proof: see Appendix B.
Given that the two roots in Lemma 2.1 have opposite signs, we can establish existence
and uniqueness of a BGP with positive growth.
Proposition 2.2 (Growth Rate with Delay)
Under the assumptions of Proposition 2.1, the NDE (5) governing the dynamics with
delay τ > 0 admits two BGPs associated with:
(i) a positive growth rate gτ > 0, such that g0 > gτ > ga, where ga ≡ ε is the growth rate
4Whether there is commitment or not, the model’s BGP with positive growth is such that g > r.
However, this property does not mean that dynamic ineﬃciency prevails, as technology is linear in the
AK model.
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under autarky and g0 is the no-delay growth rate, and limτ→0 gτ = g0, limτ→∞ gτ = ga.
(ii) a negative growth rate hτ < 0 such that limτ→0 hτ = −∞, limτ→∞ hτ = 0.
Although Proposition 2.2 establishes existence of a BGP with negative growth associ-
ated to hτ , the next section shows that it is unstable. Therefore, we focus on the BGP
associated to gτ , whose comparative statics properties can be studied graphically. To do
that, it is useful to rewrite the characteristic equation as (g − ε)egτ = λ(g − r) and to
graph both sides of it.
In figure 1, the left-hand side of (g − ε)egτ = λ(g − r) shifts up (respectively down)
with τ (respectively ε, that is, with s and A). It follows that dgτ/dτ < 0. In addition,
the right-hand side goes up with λ in figure 1, which implies that dgτ/dλ > 0. In sum-
mary, access to international borrowing fosters growth but the no-commitment delay is
detrimental to growth.5
Figure 1: comparative statics of the positive growth rate gτ
5It also follows from figure 1 that dhτ/dτ > 0 > dhτ/dλ.
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Proposition 2.3 (Comparative Statics of Positive Growth Rate with Delay)
Under the assumptions of Proposition 2.1, one has dgτ/dλ > 0 > dgτ/dτ . That is,
access to foreign borrowing fosters growth whereas the no-commitment delay dampens
growth.
The impact of λ and τ on the BGP growth rate conforms with intuition. Given τ , a
higher λ implies higher growth because it relaxes the borrowing constraint. This is the
growth enhanging-eﬀect of foreign borrowing. Moreover, in a growing economy where the
stock of capital is increasing over time, the higher the delay τ in observing K, given λ,
the lower the stock of collateral, hence the tighter the borrowing contraint and the lower
the growth rate. This history eﬀect is detrimental to growth and may possibly undo
the growth benefits of financial integration. In fact, the BGP growth rate converges
exponentially fast to the autarkic one - ga - when τ increases from zero, as shown in
figure 2. Therefore, small informational lags due to imperfect contract enforcement may
undo the growth benefits of having access to foreign borrowing. The next section will
provide numerical examples showing how fast the growth benefits of openness dissipate
under no commitment.
Figure 2: the positive growth rate gτ as a function of the no-commitment delay τ
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2.2 Stability of BGP
We define x(t) = e−gtK(t) as detrended capital stock and we perform this change of
variable in (5). When either g = gτ > 0 or g = hτ < 0, this change yields the following
detrended NDE:
x˙(t) = λe−gτ x˙(t− τ) + (g − ε){x(t− τ)− x(t)} (6)
where gτ −ε > 0 > hτ under the assumptions of Proposition 2.1. The following property
is a key step in the process of studying the stability of the BGP with positive growth.
It can be readily shown that the roots of the characteristic equation associated to the
detrended equation (6) are obtained from those of the original NDE (5) by applying a
translation of −g. This comes from the linearity of the NDE. In view of Lemma 2.1, it
follows that both 0 and hτ −gτ < 0 are roots of the characteristic function corresponding
to equation (6). We now make use of the null root to establish the stability of the positive
BGP. In the proof, we extensively use results from Kordonis et al. [13] that apply to
more general NDEs.
Proposition 2.4 (Stability of the Positive BGP)
Under the assumptions of Proposition 2.1, the following holds for all τ > 0:
(i) the BGP of (5) associated to gτ > 0 is asymptotically stable,
(ii) the BGP of (5) associated to hτ < 0 is unstable.
Proof: see Appendix C.
Of some interest is the fact that Proposition 2.4 ensuring stability of the positive BGP
also delivers an expression for the long-run level of K, that we now use. In contrast, most
of the literature on economic applications of (non-neutral) delayed diﬀerential equation
(e.g. Boucekkine et al. [5]) do not easily characterize the asymptotic level.
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Corollary 2.1 (Long-Run Level)
Under the assumptions of Proposition 2.1, suppose that φ(t) is the initial function of
the detrended NDE (6), that is, x(t) = φ(t) for t ∈ [−τ, 0]. Then the BGP associated to
gτ > 0 is such that limt→∞K(t) = ψegτ t, where:
ψ =
φ(0)− λe−gτ τφ(−τ) + (gτ − ε)
$ 0
−τ φ(s)ds
1− λe−gτ τ + τ(gτ − ε)
. (7)
Proof: Follows from the proof of Proposition 2.4. 2
Notice that in contrast to the standard AK model, the long-run level ψ does not only
depend on the initial condition φ(0) but also on the whole path for t ∈ [−τ, 0]. This
essentially means that two countries with the same φ(0) but diﬀerent histories (in the
sense that their integral terms in (7) diﬀer) end up with distinct long-run levels. This
feature and the dependence of ψ on λ and τ are studied in the next section.
3 Leapfrogging and Growth Reversals
3.1 Long-Run Level: Leapfrogging
As the expression of ψ in (7) is not easily amenable to analysis, we study the compara-
tive statics through a simple example. An important feature of the long-run level is that
it depends on the initial growth path. If x(t) = φ, where φ > 0 is a given constant, for
t ∈ [−τ, 0], then ψ = φ. In other words, if the economy starts right on the BGP, then such
a path solves (6) and therefore it will stay there forever. Suppose instead that x(t) = eμt
for t ∈ [−τ, 0] for some μ W= 0. Then the economy grows exponentially for t ∈ [−τ, 0] at
some given rate μ, possibly negative if we want to account for slow-growing countries,
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that is, countries which experience growth rates below trend. Then the expression in (7)
becomes:
ψ =
1− λe−τ(gτ+μ) + (gτ − ε)(1− e−τμ)/μ
1− λe−gτ τ + τ(gτ − ε)
. (8)
We are interested in how the initial growth rate μ aﬀects the long-run level of capital
and output through ψ. Our main result is that leapfrogging occurs when the delay τ is
small enough. For simplicity, we restrict the analysis to values of the initial growth rate
that are small enough to make a second-order approximation accurate. This is acceptable
in view of the fact that μ measures the growth rate so that its values are bound to be
smaller than 10% in absolute value according to historical evidence.
Direct inspection of (8) shows that the numerator depends on μ whereas the (positive)
denominator does not. It is straightforward to show that ψ is an increasing function of
μ at μ = 0 if and only if the delay is small enough, which proves the following result.6
Proposition 3.1 (Leapfrogging)
Under the assumptions of Proposition 2.1, suppose that the initial function of the de-
trended NDE (6) is x(t) = eμt for t ∈ [−τ, 0] and some μ real. Then if the initial growth
rate μ is close to zero, there is leapfrogging if and only if τ < 2/(gτ − r) ≡ τlf .
Note that leapfrogging happens when the delay is arbitrarily close to zero. This can
be further illustrated through an example, using figure 3. Suppose that two economies
are similar except for their initial growth rates μl > μs. This means that both countries
have the same BGP and diﬀer only by their initial growth path for t ∈ [−τ, 0]. In other
words, country with μl has been initially poorer than country μs, though both end up
with the same initial condition at t = 0. Leapfrogging can be explained as the outcome of
6More precisely, the derivative of the numerator of ψ in (8) can be approximated by τ{1/(gτ−r)−τ/2}
when μ ≈ 0, using that eτμ ≈ 1 + τμ+ (τμ)2/2.
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two conflicting eﬀects, the growth-enhancing eﬀect and the history eﬀect that dampens
growth. The growth eﬀect is favorable to leapfrogging because country μl gets to lnx(0)
at t = 0 at a faster growth rate, hence should leapfrog country μs for t > 0. In contrast,
the history eﬀect implies that country μl had less capital at t = −τ - that is, less collateral
- hence faces at t = 0 a tighter borrowing constraint than country μs, which goes against
leapfrogging. If the delay is small, then the latter eﬀect is dominated by the former eﬀect
and there is leapfrogging, that is, ψμl > ψμs . As a consequence, country μl follows for
t > 0 a path that will converge to ψμl while the path of country μs converges to the
lower level ψμs . Eventually, therefore, country μl will lead.
This sharply contrasts with what happens under commitment: with τ = 0, we are
back to the standard AK model without delay in which both economies are identical
and evolve on the same BGP with growth rate g0. Although leapfrogging does not occur
with τ = 0, our result above shows that it does as long as τ > 0, however arbitrarily
small. In view of Proposition 3.1, leapfrogging also arises for intermediate values of τ ,
as τlf is expected to be large for reasonable values of gτ − r.
Figure 3: leapfrogging
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3.2 Non-Monotonic Convergence to BGP: Growth Reversals
We now study the short-run dynamics by implementing the method of steps. Recall
first that if x(t) = φ for t ∈ [−τ, 0], then such a path solves (6) so that there is no
transitional dynamics. Therefore, we focus again, as in subsection 3.1, on exponential
growth in the initial time interval and we provide a necessary and suﬃcient condition
for growth reversals to occur. As in Cuberes and Jerzmanowski [7], we define a growth
reversal as a situation such that the growth rate goes through the BGP growth rate gτ
at a break date, either from below (growth miracles) or from above (growth disasters).
More precisely, a growth reversal occurs when the detrended growth rate right before
t = 0 and the growth rate right after t = 0 have opposite signs.
Proposition 3.2 (Non-monotonic Convergence to Positive BGP)
Under the assumptions of Proposition 2.1, suppose that the initial function of the de-
trended NDE (6) is x(t) = eμt for t ∈ [−τ, 0] and some μ real. It follows that μx˙(0) < 0,
hence convergence to the positive BGP is non-monotonic, if and only if:
gτ > r +
μ
eμτ − 1 , (9)
The above condition is violated if τ = 0, and it is met if τ =∞ provided that μ > r− gτ .
In addition, if μ ≈ 0, then condition (9) writes as:
τ > 1/(gτ − r) ≡ τgr. (10)
Proof: See Appendix D.
The above condition characterizes growth reversals that occur at t+ τ . On the other
hand, violating condition (9) does not preclude growth reversals that unfold at t + nτ ,
n > 1. It is straightforward to extend Proposition 3.2 so as to derive conditions under
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which this happens. For space consideration, however, we do not develop our analysis
along these lines and simply conjecture that growth reversals at t+ nτ are expected for
smaller values of the no-commitment delay τ .
Figure 4: growth disaster
Figure 4 pictures a growth disaster that occurs when μ > 0, under condition (9) in
Proposition 3.2. At t = 0, there is a sudden fall in the growth rate, which goes from above
to below trend. Similarly, a growth miracle occurs under condition (9) when μ < 0. It is
interesting to note that growth reversals at break dates are associated with endogenous
sudden stops of capital inflows that are not, in our model, caused by shocks (as, e.g.,
Mendoza in [15]).
Although short-run and long-run eﬀects are diﬀerent aspects, both depend on initial
conditions and it is perhaps illuminating to relate them. This is now our goal, when μ is
close to zero for simplicity. From Propositions 3.1 and 3.2, it follows that τlf = 2τgr > τgr
when μ ≈ 0. This means that the absence of leapfrogging for μ close to zero implies
growth reversals. Intuitively, the delay is so large that the history eﬀect now dominates
18
the growth eﬀect, as illustrated in figure 5. Suppose that we compare two countries with
μl > 0 > μs. The country that is initially poor is catching up with the rich but declining
country. The fact that there is no leapfrogging means that the capital and output levels
of country μl will stay below that of country μs for t large. Figure 5 illustrates this
result: no leapfrogging implies growth reversals because there must be a sharp break in
the rate of change at t = 0 that reverts the direction of growth. The history eﬀect now
dominates the growth eﬀect, so that country μs will enjoy at t = 0 the benefits of having
had a lot of collateral at t = −τ and will start growing again above trend for t > 0. In
contrast, country μl will now be punished for having had too low a stock of capital in the
past. In that case, the history eﬀect dampens growth and it both prevents leapfrogging
and entails growth reversals.
Figure 5: no leapfrogging implies growth reversals
The intermediate case such that leapfrogging and growth reversals coexist (when τlf >
τ > τgr) is omitted for brevity. A numerical example is given in the next section.
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3.3 Quantitative Implications
The aim of this section is to show that the model’s predictions regarding growth
breaks and growth reversals accord with the empirical evidence. In addition, the analysis
enables us to connect such episodes to long-run eﬀects, as both features depend on initial
conditions.
First, we ask whether or not the model is able to replicate the observed growth changes.
Figure 6 below pictures the distribution of growth changes at break dates computed by
Cuberes and Jerzmanowski [7, p. 1275] from the Penn World Table for the period 1950-
2000. In particular, the mean change in trend growth is about −0.007 (that is, −0.7
percentage points) and the distribution is slightly right-skewed.
Figure 6: density of growth-rate changes at break dates, from Penn World Table,
1950-2000. Source: Cuberes and Jerzmanowski [7, fig. 2]
Going back to the model, suppose that the autarkic growth rate ga ≡ ε = 0.03 and
that the world interest rate is r = 0.01. Then if λ = 0.5 (within the range of estimates
from Djankov et al. [9] for developing countries), the no-delay growth rate is g0 = 0.05.
With commitment, therefore, foreign borrowing would increase the BGP growth rate
from 3% under autarky to 5% under financial openness. The no-commitment delay,
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however, reduces the growth benefits from international borrowing and table 1 below
shows how quickly gτ converges to ga when τ goes up.
Eﬀect of delay τ on: τ = 0 τ = 0.1 τ = 1 τ = 10 τ = 100
growth rate with delay gτ = 5% 4.98% 4.8% 4% 3.05%
dissipation of growth benefits (g0 − gτ )/(g0 − ga) = 0% 1% 10% 50% 98%
Table 1: Eﬀect of delay on growth rate level and benefits
For example, the fifth column of table 1 shows that the growth benefits from openness
dissipate by half for as low a value of the delay as τ = 10. The history eﬀect of borrowing
without commitment hampers growth by a significant amount for small delays.
We now show that the growth rate changes at break dates predicted by the model
accord with the evidence. Using the proof Proposition 3.2 (see Appendix D), the change
in the growth rate at t = 0 is x˙(0) − μ, with x˙(0) = (gτ − ε){[1 + μ/(gτ − r)]e−τμ − 1}.
It follows that for τ close to zero, one has x˙(0) ≈ μ(g0 − ε)/(g0 − r). Given our chosen
parameter values, x˙(0) − μ ≈ −μ/2. Essentially, this means that for small delays, the
initial growth rate is divided by 2 at t = 0, which indicates abrupt growth breaks. The
history eﬀect hampers growth by a significant margin even for small deviations from
perfect contract enforcement. It follows that μ = 0.014 delivers a growth change at the
break date t = 0 equal to x˙(0) − μ ≈ −0.007. That is, the model replicates the mean
change at break dates from Cuberes and Jerzmanowski [7, fig. 2], reported in figure 6,
for small delays. See, for example, the third column of table 2 when τ = 0.1.
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Eﬀect of initial growth rate μ on: μ = −0.05 μ = 0.014 μ = 0.05
growth rate changes x˙(0)− μ = 0.025 −0.007 −0.025
Table 2: Growth changes at break date, for τ = 0.1
Cuberes and Jerzmanowski [7, p. 1275] also observe that the density of growth rate
changes is slightly right-skewed, indicating that large negative changes are more common
and can be as large as −0.025 for 10% of the sample (see figure 6 and also Cuberes and
Jerzmanowski [7, fig. 8] for non-democracies). The last column of table 2 shows that such
values occur also in the model when μ is larger. Essentially, the faster the economy was
growing (over and above trend growth) prior to the break date, the larger the history
eﬀect and the more abrupt the growth rate change. In addition, the second column of
Table 2 shows that small delays account for positive changes in the growth rate as well.
For instance, the model predicts a value of 0.025 for the growth rate change at break
date, which occurs at frequency around 7% according to figure 6.
Turning now to growth reversals (see figure 4), we learn from Proposition 3.2 that it
takes larger τ ’s to explain them. For example, condition (9) is met for any positive μ if
and only if τ ≥ 45. Table 3 reports the growth changes associated with growth disasters,
that is, when the sign of the growth rate turns negative at break date, for τ = 45.7
Eﬀect of initial growth rate μ on: μ = 0.014 μ = 0.05
growth rate changes xI(0)− μ = −0.014 −0.052
Table 3: Growth disasters at break date, for τ = 45
7For τ = 45, the growth benefits from openness dissipate by a factor of about 87%.
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Note that the growth rate changes at break date in table 3, when there are growth
reversals, still fall within the range depicted in figure 6. That is, the model predicts
growth disasters that fall within the ballpark. However, to account for growth miracles
- such that the growth rate goes above trend from below - is more demanding. This is
because condition (9) requires even larger τ ’s when μ < 0. For example, when τ = 65
and μ = −0.01, the change in growth rate xI(0)− μ ≈ 0.01. Therefore, with delays that
are large enough, growth reversals implying growth acceleration may be explained as
well.
In addition to explaining growth reversals, we can use condition (8) to measure the
magnitude of leapfrogging eﬀects. Interestingly enough, growth reversal when τ = 65, in
our last example, does not prevent leapfrogging because τlf ≈ 93 > τ = 65 > τgr ≈ 45
so that for such a value of the delay, poor countries growing fast may leapfrog rich but
declining countries. For example, set τ = 65 and suppose we compare two countries that
are identical except for their growth rate μ for t ∈ [−τ, 0]. Country L has μl = gτ , that is,
it has grown twice faster than the long-run growth rate in the past. In contrast, country
S is richer but has not grown in the past, that is, has μs = −gτ so that its capital, output
and consumption have been stagnating. Using (8), we compute that country L will end
up with a long-run level of capital, output and consumption that is 30% higher than that
of country S. In other words, the fast-growing country will leapfrog the declining country
by a significant amount. The price to pay, however, for country L is to go through (large)
growth reversals that country S does not experience.
4 Conclusion
This paper has proposed a simple open-economy AK model of growth reversals due
to collateral constraints under no commitment to investment. Although the model is
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highly stylized, it explains leapfrogging and growth reversals. Both features occur as
outcomes of two antagonistic forces unleashed by foreign borrowing without commitment
to investment. Strikingly enough, the history eﬀect hampers growth by a significant
margin for small deviations from perfect contract enforcement. We believe that the key
feature of the model - the no-commitment delay - may well capture important aspects of
how actual international credit markets are being imperfect. More precisely, it embodies
the idea that a slow-growing country that has been rich in the past has better access
to international debt markets than a fast-growing but still catching-up country. This
idea itself materializes in the actual working of debt markets because the former country
would have better historical record of repayment rates and better reputation than the
latter. One key result of this paper is to show that small delays matter, as they may
at the same time contribute to undo the growth benefits from financial openness, favor
leapgrogging and lead to growth breaks.
A Discrete-Time Model With One-Period Lag
The purpose of this section is to study the discrete-time version of the model with a one-period
lag. The main result is that the lag creates a poverty trap (negative growth) BGP but generates
monotonic convergence to the positive BGP.
The discrete-time analog of budget constraint (3) is:
Kt+1 −Dt+1 = (sA+ 1− δ)Kt − (1 + r)Dt. (11)
The benchmark case with commitment, that is, no delay occurs when Dt+1 = λKt+1. Then
the growth rate is g0 = (sA− δ − rλ)/(1− λ), as in the continuous-time model (see Proposition
2.1). Under the assumptions of Proposition 2.1, the comparative statics are identical and there
is no transitional dynamics. In particular, one has g0 > ga (that is, openness is good for growth).
Next, we follow Cohen and Sachs [6] and introduces a one-period lag: Dt+1 = λKt. Then (11)
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becomes:
Kt+1 = (sA+ 1− δ + λ)Kt − λ(1 + r)Kt−1. (12)
Defining gt+1 ≡ Kt+1/Kt − 1, (12) can be written as
gt+1 = γ −
φ
1 + gt
, (13)
where γ ≡ sA − δ + λ > 0 and φ ≡ λ(1 + r) > 0. It is straightforward to show that (13)
admits two stationary solutions g > 0 and 0 > h > −1. As in section 2, under the assumptions
of Proposition 2.1, one has dg/dλ > 0: opening to international financial markets promotes
growth. In addition, g < g0. Here again, problems of contractual enforcement leading to an
informational lag dampen growth. Figure 7 shows that there is monotonic convergence towards
the positive BGP g provided that the initial growth rate is larger than the negative BGP rate
h. Therefore, in contrast to the continuous-time version with delay studied in section 2, the
discrete-time version with a one-period lag cannot explain growth reversals. This suggests that
if non-monotonic convergence to the BGP is to be explained within the discrete-time model, it
requires a longer lag. However, larger delays lead to non-linear, higher dimensional diﬀerence
equations for which explicit solutions and conditions for global stability are very demanding.
Essentially, increasing the lag by one period means that the non-linear dynamics goes up by one
dimension. For instance, the model with a two-period lag, that is, Dt+1 = λKt−1, leads to a
2-dimensional, nonlinear dynamical system for which analytical results hardly go beyond local
stability properties.
Figure 7: monotonic convergence in the discrete-time model with a one-period lag
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B Proof of Lemma 2.1
The existence of a real root gτ > 0 of Q(x) ≡ x−ε+λ(r−x)e−xτ follows from the intermediate
value theorem, as Q(x) is a continuous function with Q(0) = rλ− ε < 0 and limx→∞Q(x) =∞.
To ensure uniqueness, we now show that QI(gτ ) > 0 for any such gτ > 0, which is equivalent to:
1− λe−gττ + τ (gτ − r)e−gττ > 0
and is satisfied, as 1 > λ > λe−gττ , if gτ > r which is equivalent to gτ > ε in view of g =
ε + λ(g − r)e−gτ . It is not diﬃcult to show, using g = ε + λ(g − r)e−gτ again, that the latter
inequality writes ε > r which is one of the assumptions of Proposition 2.1.
To show that there exists a unique real hτ < 0 solving g = ε + λ(g − r)e−gτ , we use again the
intermediate value theorem and the fact that Q(0) = rλ− ε < 0 and limx→−∞Q(x) =∞. Then
the condition that QI(hτ ) < 0 for any such hτ < 0 is equivalent to:
1− λe−gττ + τ (hτ − r)e−hττ < 0
which is met, as hτ − r < 0 and 1 < λe−hττ , or using that λe−hττ = (hτ − ε)/(hτ − r), ε > r
which is met under the assumptions of Proposition 2.1. 2
C Proof of Proposition 2.4
Our proof of (i) is based on corollaries 1 and 3 in Kordonis et al. [13]. The zero real root
of (6) satisfies the condition that aτ + b < 1, that is, τ (gτ − ε) + λe−gτ τ < 1 or equivalently
τegττ (gτ−ε)+λ < egτ τ . To show this, recall that ex =
∞
n=0 x
n/n! so that τegττ (gτ−ε)+λ < egττ
if and only if, using Q(gτ ) = 0, τλ(gτ − r) + λ <
∞
n=0 (gττ )
n/n!. The latter inequality
is then −rλτ < (1 + gττ )(1 − λ) +
∞
n=2 (gτ τ)
n
/n!, which is met because 1 > λ under the
assumptions of Proposition 2.1. Therefore, 0 satisfies condition (Q) in corollary 1 of Kordo-
nis et al. [13, p. 461] and, as result, limt→∞ x(φ; t) = ψ, for some constant ψ, where φ(t),
for t ∈ [−τ, 0], is the initial function. Therefore, limt→∞K(t) = ψegτ t. From corollary 3
in Kordonis et al. [13, p. 463], it follows that the trivial solution (6) is uniformly stable,
and, from corollary 1 of Kordonis et al. [13, p. 461] that if φ(t) is the initial function of
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the detrended NDE (6), that is, x(t) = φ(t) for t ∈ [−τ, 0] then limt→∞ x(φ; t) = ψ where
ψ = {φ(0) − λe−gττφ(−τ) + (gτ − ε)
$ 0
−τ φ(s)ds}/{1 − λe−gττ + τ (gτ − ε)}. It follows that
limt→∞K(t) = ψe
gτ t, that is, the BGP associated to gτ > 0 is asymptotically stable.
To prove (ii), we cannot use corollary 3 in Kordonis et al. [13] because hτ − gτ < 0 does not
satisfy their property P (λ0). Therefore, we rely on corollary 2.2 of Freedman and Kuang [10, p.
190]: because our parameter b ≡ λe−hττ > 1, we are in the case such that the trivial solution of
(6) and the BGP associated with hτ are unstable. 2
D Proof of Proposition 3.2
Rewrite (6) as:
x˙(t) = −ax(t) + f(t) (14)
and suppose that the initial function is x(t) = eμt, so that x˙(t) = μeμt, for t ∈ [−τ, 0] and
some real μ. Then from (6), f(t) = aeμ(t−τ) + μbeμ(t−τ) = Keμt, where K ≡ (a + bμ)e−μτ . A
solution to the ODE (14) is then of the form x(t) = K1e
−at +K2e
μt, for some K1,K2 to be de-
termined. But the particular solution K2e
μt solves (14) if and only if μK2e
μt = −aK2eμt+Keμt
which gives K2 = K/(μ + a). Moreover, from x
−
0 (0) = 1 and x
+
0 (0) = K1 + K2, one gets
that K1 = 1 − K/(μ + a). Therefore, one has that the general solution is such that x˙(t) =
−a[1 − K/(μ + a)]e−at + μKeμt/(μ + a) so that x˙(0) = K − a. It follows that if μ > 0, then
x˙(0) < 0 if and only if K < a, which can be written as gτ > r + μ/(e
μτ − 1). Similarly, if μ < 0,
one has that x˙(0) > 0 under the same condition. Direct inspection of equation (9) shows that
it is violated when τ = 0, as g0 < ∞, whereas it is met when when τ = ∞, as g∞ = ε > r
when μ > 0 under the assumptions of Proposition 2.1 and provided that μ > r− gτ when μ < 0.
Finally, using that eτμ ≈ 1+ τμ+ (τμ)2/2 when μ ≈ 0, condition (9) writes as τ > 1/(gτ − r). 2
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E Optimal Growth Model
Consider the maximization of the intertemporal welfare function
$∞
0
e−ρt C(t)
1−θ−1
1−θ dt under
the state equation:
K˙(t) = λK˙(t− τ ) + (A− δ)K(t)− rλK(t− τ)− C(t), (15)
where ρ and θ are the usual time preference and risk aversion positive parameters. Given an
initial profile for capital, K0(t), on [−τ , 0], where K0(t) is piecewise diﬀerentiable, a trajectory
(C(t),K(t)), t ≥ 0, is optimal if it checks (15) with C(t) positive and piecewise continuous, K(t)
positive and piecewise diﬀerentiable, if the integral objective function is convergent, and if the
value of the latter is greater than or equal to its value along any other admissible trajectory.
Proposition E.1 Let φ > A− δ be the unique positive solution of the x-equation:
1− A− δ
x
− λe−xτ = 0.
φ is a decreasing function of the delay τ : it tends to A − δ when τ tends to ∞, and it tends to
A−δ
1−λ when τ tends to zero. The optimal control problem has a solution if φ(1− θ) < ρ.
Proof: Define by L1
D
e−ψt
i
the set of functions such that
$∞
0
|f |e−ψt dt < ∞, and consider the
topology σ(L1, L∞). The trickiest part of the proof is to identify a ψ > 0 such that all the
variables lie in balls of L1
D
e−ψt
i
. The hemi-continuity of the operator defining the objective
function of the problem, that is V (c) =
$∞
0
e−ρt C(t)
1−θ−1
1−θ dt, in the topology σ(L
1, L∞), will
complete the argument. More details can be found in Askenazy and Le Van [3] or Boucekkine et
al. [5]. Here we concentrate on the identification of ψ. Using the law of motion of human capital
and given that −rλ < 0, one starts with the inequality:
λK˙(t− τ ) + (A− δ)K(t) ≥ K˙(t).
If K(t) grows at rate x, the inequality implies that:
λe−xτ ≥ 1− A− δ
x
.
It is readily shown that for x to check the latter inequality, x cannot exceed φ given by the
Proposition. φ is therefore the maximal growth rate allowed by the accumulation technology of
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the model. It is easy to prove that this maximal growth rate degenerates to A−δ1−λ when the delay
vanishes. As the delay increases, the maximal growth rate allowed shrinks, reaching the limit
A − δ when the delay goes to infinity. It is then enough to notice that φ is also the maximal
growth rate for Y and for C given the technological and resource constraints of the problem. In
such a case, if one assumes ψ = ρ−φ(1−θ) > 0, all the variables are indeed in balls of L1
D
e−ψt
i
. 2
The computation of necessary (and suﬃcient) optimality conditions are adapted from Boucekkine
et al. (2005) who handle the optimal control of a functional diﬀerential equations of the delayed
type. The extension to the neutral case can be readily done. One gets the following first-order
conditions.
Proposition E.2 If (C(t),K(t)), t ≥ 0, is an interior optimal solution, then there exists a
piecewise diﬀerentiable function q(t) such that for all t ≥ 0:
q(t) = e−ρtC(t)−θ, (16)
(A− δ)q(t) + q˙(t)− rλq(t+ τ)− λq˙(t+ τ ) = 0 (17)
Now we show that the stability properties of the induced dynamic system can be trivially
adapted from section 2. First, one has to make the following observation.
Proposition E.3 A balanced growth path for the system (16)-(17) is determined by gc = − gq+ρθ ,
where gx is the growth rate of x along the BGP. It follows that gq < 0 is the opposite of the growth
rate(s) encountered in Proposition 2.2 with s = 1.
The proof is trivial. The relationship gc = −gq+ρθ immediately comes from (16). The second,
and more important, property directly derives from looking balanced growth solutions to the
adjoint equation (17). One finds:
gq = λgq e
τgq + rλ eτgq − (A− δ),
where A−δ coincides with ε when s = 1. One obtains exactly the same characterization of BGPs
in Proposition 2.4 (when s = 1), with g = −gq. It is then possible to state the following stability
result, directly adapted from Proposition 2.4.
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Proposition E.4 Under the assumptions of Proposition 2.4 (with s = 1), the BGP of (16)-(17)
associated to gq < 0 is asymptotically stable. The one associated with gq > 0 is unstable.
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